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基于经理人声誉机制的企业预算松弛治理探析 被引量:1

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摘要 经理人的预算松弛是破坏组织预算有效性的一个重要因素,而预算松弛成因和治理需要从多角度分析以对症下药。基于经理人声誉考虑建立声誉机制,对进入经理市场的经理人和对未来有长期规划的经理人,在抑制预算松弛方面都能够发挥其积极作用。具体在实际操作中,可以采取建立基于相机奖励的声誉机制、基于参与式预算承诺的声誉机制两种措施。
作者 孙灵灵
出处 《山东纺织经济》 2012年第3期32-34,共3页 Shandong Textile Economy
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