基础设施BOT项目中的政府担保与最优特许期

Government Guarantee and the Optimal Charter Period of the Infrastructure BOT Project

为了吸引国内外财团、公司企业,以及个人等非政府投资主体投资于中国基础设施项目建设,政府必须对投资者无法通过市场行为进行控制的非市场风险因素提供担保。本文在分析基础设施项目政府担保行为的基础上,将政府担保价值引入特许期谈判博弈模型,分析政府担保对最优特许期决策的影响,并为政府特许期决策提供政策建议。

In order to attract the non-governmental investment in infrastructure projects subject to invest in the construction of investors, such as the domestic and foreign financial group, the company enterprise, the individual and so on, the government must provide security for the non- marketing risk factors that investors can＇t control through the marketing activities. In this paper, based on the analysis of the infrastructure projects government guarantee behavior, we try to introduce the government collateral value to the charter period negotiations game model to analyze the influence of the optimal charter time decision hy the government guarantee. In the end, we hope to provide policy suggestions for government charter time decision.