国有企业双重效率损失研究

The Dual Efficiency Losses in Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

本文基于企业效率最大化要求剩余索取权与剩余控制权相对应这一企业理论分析了国有企业的生产效率损失和创新效率损失问题。国有企业的公有产权属性决定了国有企业中存在着生产效率和创新效率的双重损失。国有企业改革通过监督和激励机制设计在一定程度上实现了生产中的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的匹配,从而提高了国有企业的生产效率。然而,由于创新具有不同于一般生产的特殊属性,已有国有企业改革措施并不能实现创新中的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的匹配,因而无法改善国有企业的创新效率。由此,本文提出了国有企业的创新效率损失大于生产效率损失的理论假说。基于中国省级国有企业和民营企业的工业行业数据,统计分析和计量模型估计结果都稳健地支持了该假说。

Based on the firm theory of efficiency maximization requiring the symmetrical arrangement of residual claim and control rights, the paper investigates theoretically and empirically the dual efficiency losses of state-owned enterprises （SOEs） in China. The ownership of SOEs determines that, in comparison with private enterprises, SOEs will have both productive efficiency loss and innovative efficiency loss. SOE reforms, through supervision and incentive mechanism designs, to a certain extent, improve SOE＇s productive efficiency; however, due to the special characteristics of innovation, they can not improve SOE＇ s innovative efficiency. Hence, in SOEs, innovative efficiency loss will be higher than productive efficiency loss. The above hypotheses are verified by the empirical study by using Chinese industry-level dataset in 30 provinces during the period of 1998-2003.