官员腐败对公司实际税率影响的实证研究被引量：8

A Study of Official Corruption to Company Effective Tax Rate

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摘要税收政策是国家重要的财政政策,当前中国官员在税收执行方面拥有很大的自由裁量权,即政府官员在决定公司享受税收优惠政策上有很大的支配权和决策空间。税务负担是企业的重要支出,为了减轻税务负担,企业有行贿官员以达到降低税务负担的动机。本文以1993～2008年来披露的省部级腐败官员的案例为基础,手工收集涉及腐败官员的上市公司,实证分析了官员腐败对公司税负的影响。研究发现,在行贿事件发生后,相对于没有行贿的公司,行贿公司的实际税率更低,而且行贿公司的实际税率在行贿事件发生后下降。我们认为应该缩小政府职能范围,限制政府官员的权利,建立官僚体系内部的约束激励机制。 Tax Policy is a important financial policy of the country, Chinese officials have great discretion in Tax Collection, Chinese officials have great Dominant power and decision space to decide to enjoy Tax incentives. Corporate tax burden is important expenditure, in order to Reduce the tax burden, Enterprises have the motivation to bribe official. Based on the cases of corrupt provincial and ministerial-level officials revealed from 1993 to 2008 and collect listed companies involving corrupt provincials by hand, the paper empirically analyses the impact of official corruption on the company＇ s tax burden. The research shows that, after bribe, the company＇ s effective tax rate would be even lower than the one＇ s that didn＇ t offer it. What＇ s more, the effective tax rate in the company also got lower than before. We think we should narrow the scope of government functions, limit the right of government officials and establish incentive constraint within the bureaucracy.

作者黄新建冉娅萍

机构地区重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出处《南方经济》 CSSCI 2012年第3期3-12,共10页 South China Journal of Economics

基金教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC790103) 2011年度中央高校科研事业费资助

关键词官员腐败实际税率政治关联 Official Corruption Effective Tax Rate Political Relationship

分类号 F275.5 [经济管理—企业管理]

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