持基激励对基金经理投资行为的影响分析

The Influence of Holding Fund Incentives on the Fund Manager's Investment Behavior

随着证券投资基金业在中国资本市场重要性的提升,基金管理公司的内部激励已越来越受到众多学者的关注。文章从委托代理理论出发,分析了基金行业存在的委托代理关系,构建了持基激励模型。在信息不对称的条件下,持基行为对基金经理的努力水平、风险选择水平以及基金业绩的影响进行研究。研究发现基金经理持基行为可以提高基金经理的投资水平,提高其信息获取能力,从而降低基金的风险,提高基金的收益率。在此基础上,利用2010年1-10月份基金管理公司自购的有关数据对持基激励的效果进行了分析并提出了建立持基激励的相关建议。

Securities investment funds play an important role in promoting the stable development of China＇s financial markets.The internal incentive of fund management has been gradually concerned by many academics.Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper analyzes the principal-agent relations existing in securities investment funds,constructs the principal-agent model of fund holding incentives.Under asymmetric information,this paper studies the effects of the holding fund incentives on the effort level of the fund manager,the level of risk selection,and the fund performance.This paper finds that fund holding behavior can improve the fund manager＇s investment level and information accession ability,so as to reduce the risk and improve the return rate.Based on the research above,this paper analyzes the effectiveness of holding fund incentives using the data of Jan-Oct in 2010.