语言与意义的“类”之别——维特根斯坦“可说与不可说”的“类”逻辑

The Differences in the Types of the Language and Meaning——Wittgenstein "can be said and not said" and "types" Logic

维特根斯坦的"可说与不可说"的划分是对语言与意义之内在关联的典型呈现。立足于"类"之别探讨语言与意义之关系,认为在"全类"的意义上,语言与意义各司其职、各安其位而又相互关联——语言的实现领域为意义奠定基础,意义领域的明确则为语言逻辑的使用提供保障;在"空类"的意义上,语言与意义之间的异质性和非对称性区别表达语言之可说与意义之不可说的界限;在对这一关联和界限把握的基础上探索"可说"的语言如何为"不可说"的意义寻求新的理解方式。

Wittgenstein＇s ＂can be said and not said＂ is the division within the meaning of the language associated with the typical presentation. This article is based on the ＂class＂ of the other to explore the relationship between language and meaning, that in ＂all classes＂ in the sense, language and meaning of their duties, the security of its position but interrelated the meaning of language lays the foundation for the realization of the field,meaning a clear field of logic was the use of language to provide protection. In the ＂empty class＂ sense, language and meaning, and the heterogeneity between the different asymmetric expression language can not say that with the sense of the boundaries to explore how to achieve consistency of language and meaning.