政治关联、财务年报恶意补丁与债务融资契约——基于民营上市公司实际控制人政治身份的实证研究

Political Relevance,Financial Annual Report Baleful Patch and Debt Financing Contract——An Empirical Research Based on the Actual Controllers' Political Status of Chinese Private Listed Companies

笔者采用2003年～2008年中国民营上市公司为样本,实证分析了实际控制人政治身份、财务年报恶意补丁出现几率及对债务融资契约的影响,发现上市公司实际控制人具备越高级别的政治身份,则上市公司发布恶意财务年报补丁的现象越少;上市公司发布了恶意财务年报补丁,则下年贷款规模明显下降,但是上市公司实际控制人的政治身份对上述负面影响有明显减弱,说明上市公司实际控制人具有的政治关联增强了上市公司出于维护潜在竞争优势的自我约束治理,从而增强了债务诚信,促进了债务契约签订。

Taking the private listed companies of China from 2003 to 2008 as samples, the author empirically analyzes the actual controllers＇ political status, the malicious patch of financial annual report and its influence on debt financing contract and finds that the higher the actual controllers＇ political status, the less the phenomenon that listed companies release baleful patch of financial annual report ; if listed companies issue malicious financial patch, the size of loans of the next year will decrease obviously, but the above negative effect of the political connection reduces obviously, which shows that the political relevance of the actual controllers of listed companies strengthens the self-discipline governance of listed companies out of maintaining the potential competitive edge. Thus the debt integrity is reinforced and the signature of debt contract is promoted.