元伦理学视阈下“正当”与“善”之辨

On “Rightness” and “Goodness” from the Perspective of Meta-ethics

"正当"和"善"既存在通约性,又有不可通约性。二者的"通约性"在于它们都有价值辞的作用和功能,"正当"具有"善"的部分特性,行为自身的正当性就是一种"内在善";相应地,"善"的各种描述性陈述也能提供用以判断一个行为正当性的标准,某些"善行为"也是"正当的行为"。二者的"不可通约"表现在:正当是评价人们是否履行义务的标准,善是评价事物是否具有价值的标准;"善"通常比"正当"有更一般的意义。在有些场合,"善"能被替换成"正当",但是不能将"正当"替换成"善";即使"正当"、"善"都用在行为中,"正当的行为"、"应当的行为"以及"善的行为"之间也有细微的差别。

Both commensurability and incommensurability can be found in ＂rightness＂ and ＂goodness＂. Their commensurabil- ity lies in that they both have the function of value words, and ＂rightness＂ owns partial characteristics of ＂goodness＂, for the ＂rightness＂ of behavior itself is a kind of ＂inner goodness＂. Correspondingly, various descriptive statements on ＂goodness＂ can also provide standard to judge the ＂rightness＂ of an action, and some ＂good behavior＂ is also ＂right behavior＂. Their ＂in- commensurability＂ displays in： ＂rightness＂ is a standard to judge whether people fulfill their obligations or not, while ＂good- ness＂ is a standard to evaluate whether one thing has value or not~ ＂goodness＂ usually possesses more general meaning than ＂rightness＂. In some situations, ＂goodness＂ can be replaced by ＂rightness＂, but ＂rightness＂ can＇t be replaced by ＂goodness＂. Even though both ＂goodness＂ and ＂rightness＂ are used in behavior, there are subtle differences among ＂right be- havior＂, ＂necessary behavior＂ and ＂good behavior＂.