摘要
考虑了内制与外包两种模式,并以内制模式为基准对IT外包合同进行研究。在外包模式下,分别研究了采取固定价格合同和基于质量的合同时,如何激励接包方付出的努力水平,使其达到内制模式下的最优努力水平,从而使得发包方在满足接包方保留收益的前提下获得更高的期望收益。同时对于影响接包方努力水平的各因素进行了分析。研究结果表明,在一定条件下,选择基于质量、引入奖惩机制的合同将会达到内制模式下的最优努力水平,并能够最大化发包方收益。此外,接包方的努力程度随着激励系数、奖惩系数的增加而增加,但是激励系数会随着奖惩系数的增大而减小,这意味着发包方需要权衡使用奖惩机制。
With insourcing model as a benchmark,IT outsourcing contracts are studied in the context of insourcing and outsourcing model.For outsourcing model,the fixed price contract and the quality-based contract are analyzed so as to find out how client can receive an effort level as high as insourcing and brings firm higher profits.The factors that affect the effort level are also analyzed.The results of the research indicate that in certain conditions,choosing quality-based contract with Reward-Punishment mechanism can get an effort level as the same as insourcing model and maximize the value of the client.Furthermore,the higher the incentive coefficient and reword-punishment coefficient are,the higher effort level the vendor provides.However,the higher the incentive coefficient is,the lower the reword-punishment coefficient will be,which implies that the client should balance the reward-punishment mechanism.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第1期180-188,共9页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金重大项目(70890081)
关键词
IT外包
合同
努力水平
质量水平
奖惩机制
IT outsourcing
contract
effort level
quality level
reward-punishment mechanism