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基于质量的IT外包合同设计及分析 被引量:2

Design and Analysis of Quality-based IT Outsourcing Contracts
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摘要 考虑了内制与外包两种模式,并以内制模式为基准对IT外包合同进行研究。在外包模式下,分别研究了采取固定价格合同和基于质量的合同时,如何激励接包方付出的努力水平,使其达到内制模式下的最优努力水平,从而使得发包方在满足接包方保留收益的前提下获得更高的期望收益。同时对于影响接包方努力水平的各因素进行了分析。研究结果表明,在一定条件下,选择基于质量、引入奖惩机制的合同将会达到内制模式下的最优努力水平,并能够最大化发包方收益。此外,接包方的努力程度随着激励系数、奖惩系数的增加而增加,但是激励系数会随着奖惩系数的增大而减小,这意味着发包方需要权衡使用奖惩机制。 With insourcing model as a benchmark,IT outsourcing contracts are studied in the context of insourcing and outsourcing model.For outsourcing model,the fixed price contract and the quality-based contract are analyzed so as to find out how client can receive an effort level as high as insourcing and brings firm higher profits.The factors that affect the effort level are also analyzed.The results of the research indicate that in certain conditions,choosing quality-based contract with Reward-Punishment mechanism can get an effort level as the same as insourcing model and maximize the value of the client.Furthermore,the higher the incentive coefficient and reword-punishment coefficient are,the higher effort level the vendor provides.However,the higher the incentive coefficient is,the lower the reword-punishment coefficient will be,which implies that the client should balance the reward-punishment mechanism.
出处 《运筹与管理》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2012年第1期180-188,共9页 Operations Research and Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金重大项目(70890081)
关键词 IT外包 合同 努力水平 质量水平 奖惩机制 IT outsourcing contract effort level quality level reward-punishment mechanism
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参考文献19

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