制度变迁、管理层股权激励和公司投资——来自股权分置改革的经验证据被引量：6

Institutional Change,Managerial Stock Incentives and Corporate Investment——Empirical Evidences from Ownership-split Reform

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摘要本文基于股权分置制度变迁的视角,通过考察管理层股权激励对公司投资决策的影响,检验管理层股权激励的有效性及内在机理。实证结果表明,股权分置改革显著改善了管理层股权激励的治理效应,降低了因管理层自利行为而导致的过度投资。此外,有微弱的证据表明,股改后国有公司管理层的股权激励缓解了公司投资不足。上述研究对解决由公司内部人控制而产生的投资过度及投资不足等代理问题具有重要的现实意义,也为从制度层面研究公司投资行为和治理机制提供了一个有益的视角。 Based on the institutional change background of ownership-split,the paper studies the impact of managerial stock incentives on investment decision and analyzes the effectiveness of managerial stock incentives and its mechanism.It finds that the ownership-split reform improves the effectiveness of managerial stock incentives and reduces overinvestment led by manager self-interested behavior.There is weak evidence that managerial stock incentives of state-owned company relieve underinvestment after the ownership-split reform.It is of vital realistic significance to solve agency problem of overinvestment and underinvestment by insider control.It also provides a new and important perspective for study on investment behavior and corporate governance mechanism from institution.

作者强国令

机构地区上海财经大学金融学院新疆财经大学金融学院

出处《山西财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第3期89-97,共9页 Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基金上海财经大学第六批研究生科研创新基金项目"股权分置股权激励和公司绩效"(CXJJ-2011-335)

关键词制度变迁股权分置改革股权激励过度投资投资不足 institutional change ownership-split reform stock incentives overinvestment

分类号 F830.91 [经济管理—金融学]

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