政府监管、自主裁量与审批效率

On the Government Regulation,Discretion Rights and Approval Efficiency in the Transitional Economy

本文以2004年至2009年我国证券市场中申请撤销特别处理的ST类公司为研究样本,考察了转轨经济环境下我国政府监管部门执行自主裁量审批的效率。通过研究,我们发现:(1)监管部门在对ST摘帽进行审批时,在精确性规则的基础上明显地运用了原则性规定,利用自主裁量的审批空间考察了申请公司的财务特征以及公司治理水平;(2)摘帽成功的公司其后续财务业绩、盈余质量显著优于摘帽失败的公司,监管部门运用自主裁量审批权将"实质上"未达要求的公司筛选出来,并对其作出区别对待。本文对于理解和评价政府监管在我国资本市场中的作用、政府审批的实际执行效率,以及重新审视政府职能转变获得的进展等问题,提供了新的可供参考的理论依据和经验证据。

This paper studies the discretion efficiency of government reg＇ulators in the transitional economy, based on the cancellation of special treatment by the ST shares samples from 2004 to 2009. The conclusion can be drawn that （ l ） regulators use their discretion to comprehensively investigate the applicant companies＇ finan- cial characteristics, governance quality, and other important factors. Regulators use the standard rules of prin- ciple reasonably. （2） After successfully cancellation of ST, the company＇s financial performance in the subse- quent years is significantly better than the company which is fail to remove the ST label. This indicates that regulators＇ discretion on ST implementation is considerably efficient to some extent. The disclosure announce- ruent has a significant market reaction.