基于踏板时间的智猪博弈吃食量与Nash均衡集合研究

Sets of Nash Equilibrium in Games of Boxed Pigs with Food Intake Related to Pedaling Time

智猪博弈是博弈论的经典模型,有鲜明的代表性和广泛的应用性.为了使该模型更具有现实指导意义,将近期类似的工作做了进一步研究,通过引进踩踏板单位时间的出食量e和单位时间的付出成本c两个新指标,计算大猪在不同情况下的吃食量,讨论该模型中纯Nash均衡和混合Nash均衡的存在情况,并说明了该模型在企业管理中有关激励机制制定与控制的实际意义.

Boxed pigs are a classic model in game theory with wide applications.To increase the guiding significance to realistic cases,the model is further studied in term of the recent literatures.The two new indices are introduced,i.e.,food outtake e and cost c in unit time.To calculate the big pig’s food intake in different conditions,the existence of pure Nash equilibrium and completely mixed Nash equilibrium are discussed.Finally the real significance of the model with respect to the designing and controlling incentives in enterprise is shown.