摘要
物流服务外包活动失败的重要原因是合作双方所缔结的契约不能有效防范由于信息不对称所引致的各种风险因素。针对这个问题,本研究对物流服务外包过程中的委托代理关系的不完全契约治理进行了研究,结果表明:与正式契约条件下的激励水平相比,供应商在不完全契约条件下能够节省更多的激励成本。
The important reason for the failure of logistics service outsourcing activities is that bilateral coop- eration contract cannot effectively prevent various risk factors arising from information asymmetry. To this prob- lem, agent relationships in incomplete contract governance has been studied in this paper in the process of logis- tics service outsourcing. The results show that customers can save more incentive costs in incomplete contract conditions compared to that of official contracts.
出处
《贵州大学学报（社会科学版）》
2012年第1期68-72,共5页
Journal of Guizhou University(Social Sciences)
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目[11YJA630063]"网络环境下服务供应链运作绩效及风险控制研究"
关键词
物流服务外包
不完全契约
治理
logistics service outsourcing
incomplete contract
governance
