期刊文献+

反垄断法宽大制度适用主体之思考 被引量:9

Reflection on the Subject of Leniency Policy in Monopoly Law
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摘要 宽大制度作为破解垄断协议执法困境的一项重要举措,应当以确定性的适用主体为前提。按照宽大制度实施的原理,垄断协议能否被实施主体竞相揭发,给予宽大可否换取更多违法主体被制裁,是确定宽大制度适用主体范畴的依据。基于此,经营者、相关个人、行业协会及相关胁迫者应当被确定为我国宽大制度的适格主体及不适格情形。同时,我国宽大制度适用于个人和行业协会时,还应当以法律对上述主体与经营者介入的垄断行为实行双罚为要件。 As an important measure to solve enforcement difficulties,leniency policy's subject should be clear.According to its principle,whether the monopoly agreements can be exposed and more enterprises or individuals can be punished is the key to determine the scope of subject.Hence,corporate,individual,trade association and intimidator should be identified as suitable and not suitable subject in China's leniency policy.It applies to individual and trade association basing on which antimonopoly law punishes the previous subject and corporate in monopoly.
作者 王玉辉
机构地区 郑州大学法学院
出处 《天津师范大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第1期76-80,共5页 Journal of Tianjin Normal University(Social Science)
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJC820115)
关键词 宽大制度 垄断协议 适用主体 《反垄断法》 leniency policy monopoly agreement subject Anti-monopoly Law
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参考文献6

  • 1Scott D.Hammond,Cornerstones of An Effective Leniency Program,Presented before the ICN Workshop on Leniency Programs,Sydney,Australia,November 2004[EB/OL].http//www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/206611.pdf,2009-10-05.
  • 2日本の会.私的独占の禁止及び公正取引の確保に関する法律[EB/OL].http://www.jftc.go.jp/dk/lawdk.html,2009-12-08.
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二级参考文献18

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引证文献9

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