摘要
A revival of empiricist theories in cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and philosophy has been led by figures such as Antonio Damasio （1994）, Lawrence Barsalou （1999）, George Lakoff （1987）, and Jesse Prinz （2002; 2004）. Their work has served to connect familiar empiricist approaches to thought and reason with contemporary cognitive psychology and neuroscience. The work of Prinz is of special philosophical significance since it aims to bring together the work of neo-empirically minded theorists in the cognitive and neuro-sciences with main themes found in contemporary philosophical theories of intentionality and reference. In this paper, I examine Prinz＇s efforts to synthesize a neo-empiricist theory of concepts with contemporary semantic theories of reference and intentionality. In part one, I analyze Prinz＇s approach in some depth. In part two, I raise a question concerning the origins of intentionality. Specifically, I am interested in examining the minimum cognitive prerequisites for intentionality within Prinz＇s theory of perception-based representation. In part three, I raise a problem case for Prinz＇s account of the requirements for intentionality, and propose an adjustment in Prinz＇s account to meet the challenge of the objection.
