从约定主义到相对主义--评哈曼的道德相对主义

From Conventionalism to Relativism:A Critical Analysis of Harman's Moral Relativism

哈曼早期的道德相对主义是一种约定主义或契约论。他的约定主义最终走向了更为彻底、更为明显的道德相对主义。哈曼的道德相对主义否定了道德虚无主义,因此,它是一种良性的相对主义,可以避免许多常见的针对道德相对主义的诘难。哈曼理论的主要问题是:人们通过隐性谈判所达成的事实上的共识既不是道德原则和道德判断的充分条件,亦非必要条件;其相对主义难以表达人们之间真实的道德分歧;由于否认存在着评价不同道德框架的客观标准,因而他的理论也难以解释不同的道德框架之间的人们如何能够开展有意义的道德争论与道德批评。

Gilbert Harman＇s earlier moral relativism is a sort ot conventionalism, i.e. a Soclal contract tnvoly. His conventionalism ultimately leads to a real moral relativism. Harman denies moral nihilism. Therefore, his relativism is a benign relativism and can avoid many often-raised objections to moral relativism. The main problems with Harman＇s relativism are： his conventionalism is neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for moral principles or moral judgments ; his relativism is unable to express real moral disagreements among the people who adopt different moral frameworks; due to his denial of universal moral principles and objective standards for evaluating different moral frameworks, it is difficult for him to explain how those who adopt differ- ent moral frameworks could argue and disagree with each other meaningfully and how criticisms between them are possible.