摘要
基于有限理性策略与适应性策略,构建两寡头企业主从型Bertrand价格博弈模型,并研究该模型的动力学性质。理论分析表明,该模型有一个不稳定的边界不动点和一个局部稳定的纳什平衡点。计算实验证实,采用有限理性策略的企业的价格调整速度较大时会引起两企业价格演化的倍周期分岔现象,并最终导致价格演化的混沌行为。保持较低的价格调节速度,获取纳什均衡利润是两寡头企业价格博弈的最优结果。
Based on the bounded rationality strategy and the adaptive strategy,a master-slave Bertrand price game model of duopoly is constructed and its dynamical properties are studied.The results of theory analysis show that the model has an unstable boundary fixed point and a local-stable Nash equilibrium point.Computational experiments confirm that taking higher price adjustment speed of the firm with bounded rationality strategy can cause period-doubling bifurcation phenomena of two firms＇ price evolution and eventually lead the price evolution to chaos.Keeping lower price adjustment speed and gaining Nash equilibrium profit is the optimal results for the price game of duopoly.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第2期91-94,共4页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173248)
河南省科技攻关计划项目(112102210354)
河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2011FJJ050)
河南省政府决策招标项目(2011B444)
华北水利水电学院高层人才基金
管理与经济学院青年教师培养专项基金资助
