效率工资、股权特征与代理成本

Efficiency Wage,Stock Structure and Agency Cost

本文研究表明,第一种效率工资对代理成本下降具有显著影响,第二、三种效率工资对代理成本下降没有影响。究其原因,与经济特征效率工资、治理机制效率工资、第三种效率工资对代理成本的影响不同有关。从股权特征来看,国有股东、负债融资增加代理成本,而大股东持股比例增加则降低代理成本。从股权特征与效率工资交互作用来看,经济特征效率工资、第一种效率工资与股权特征的监管水平在一定条件下存在替代关系。此外,效率工资和股权特征对公司绩效影响与对代理成本的影响总体一致,但也存在一些差异。

There are fairly abundant literatures about corporate governance theory including financial structure, enterprise performance and agency cost. But the literatures are very rare, which explore the relationship of between efficiency wage, stock structure and agency cost empirically. So this paper explores the influence of efficiency wage and stock structure on manager agency cost, and furthermore compares it with that on firm performance. According to the related literatures and researches on basic theories, this paper puts forward the following assumptions. First- ly, efficiency wage can decrease the manager agency cost, and the higher the efficiency wage, the more helpful for decreasing agency cost. Secondly, stock structure character will affect the enterprise manager agency cost; if enterprise＇s stock structure strengthens its inner governance system, it will decrease the enterprise＇s agency cost, otherwise it will increase the enterprise agency cost; ownership structure characteristics may not have the impact on the influence of efficiency wage for agency cost, and maybe it has tradeoff or inhibited relationship with efficiency wage. For further understanding of the influence of efficiency wage for agency cost, this paper would check the af- fection of efficiency wage through wage structure as well. The empirical results show that the first efficiency wage has significant influence on decreasing agency cost, while the second and third one don＇t have significant influence on decreasing agency cost. The different influences of the three kinds of efficiency wages for decreasing the agency cost are due to different effects on agency cost from economy contributing efficiency wage, governance contributing efficiency wage and the third efficiency wage contri- bution. From the perspective of ownership characteristics, state-owned shareholder and debt financing add agency cost, while the increase of share ownership of large shareholders can reduce agency cost. From the perspective of interaction of ownership characteristics and efficiency wages, economy contributing efficiency wage and the first effi- ciency wage substitute stock structure in decreasing agency cost on given conditions. Efficiency wage can signifi- cantly lower agency cost, while the wage gap in the interior management, between management and workers, the growth of wages do not have significant effect on agency cost. Therefore, efficiency wages indeed play a particular role which other wage policies cannot play in corporate governance. The impact of efficiency wage and ownership characteristics on company＇s performance and agency cost has intrinsically logic consistency, but there also has some differences. For example, governance contributing efficiency wage produces a negative influence on firm per- formance, the interaction of between stock structure and efficiency wage has not an evident effect on firm perform- ance, and different wages polices bring about a positive effect on firm performance more or less. From the above conclusions we can get some beneficial policy proposals： the enterprise should determine its best efficiency wages a- bove market level based on the economic characteristics; efficiency wage should play a full role in corporate govern- ance, which can narrow the gap between the internal income assignment; the firm should improve the share owner- ship of big shareholders and management and pay more attention to the alternative relations between ownership char- acteristics and efficiency wages. The paper contributes to the related literatures evidently： first I study that efficien- cy wage affects agency cost in the listed companies in China, and discusses the interaction of ownership characteris- tics and efficiency wage, which remedy deficiency of existing literatures ; second I construct three kinds of efficiency wages and explore their relationship with great art, which deepen the cognition about the level of efficiency wage and the function of different efficiency wages. Moreover, this paper compares the different influence of efficiency wage policy and other wage policies for enterprise agency cost and enterprise performance, which has important ref- erence value for enterprise＇s practice.