论高等教育投资的信号成本与市场扭曲

Why Can't High Degree Bring About High Returns?

随着20世纪90年代末我国高等教育的大规模扩招,高校各层次在校生人数急剧增加,国内人力资本过度投资的现象开始显现,而合适的社会就业岗位并没有相应快速增加,因而造成了日益严峻的就业问题。根据Spence的信号理论,教育对劳动生产率并没有增强的作用,而只能向雇主和社会发送信号以确定个体劳动者具备更高的生产能力或更好的可培训能力。在面临严峻就业问题时,高能力者就需要作进一步的教育投资,以发送文凭信号而被正确识别出来。这种为发送信号而进行追加教育投资的现象广泛存在,但并不能确保为个人带来更高收益,却会导致就业市场人力资源配置的扭曲,浪费国家稀缺的教育资源。

With the largescale enrollment of higher education in China since the late 1990s, highde gree employees have sharply increased within a couple of years, while the appropriate jobs haven＇t in creased proportionally. Hence the problem of overinvestment on human capital. In face of the severe job market, capable graduates have had to pursue a higher degree in order to distinguish themselves from ordinary employees. According to the Signal Theory of A. Michael Spence, education isn＇t pro ductive but only a signal of capability, which means extra investment on higher education may not se cure higher returns but result in a waste both for individuals and educational resources.