中央银行沟通、实际干预与通货膨胀稳定

Central Bank Communication,Actual Intervention and Inflation Stabilization

近年来,中央银行沟通已成为一种重要的货币政策工具。本文把中央银行沟通因素引入修正的卢卡斯总供给函数,发现加大中央银行沟通力度有利于引导通货膨胀预期,稳定通货膨胀。采用2003-2009年月度数据,利用结构向量自回归方法对中央银行沟通及实际干预在稳定通货膨胀中的作用进行实证研究,主要结论如下:(1)正的中央银行沟通冲击能有效降低通货膨胀预期以及名义通货膨胀率,且时滞短;(2)正的实际干预(包括银行贷款利率、央票利率及货币供应量)冲击,在短期内不但不能降低通货膨胀预期及名义通货膨胀率,反而会加剧通货膨胀,出现"价格之谜"现象。此外,本文对大多数情况下我国中央银行沟通模棱两可的合理性进行了解释。

Central bank communication has come to play an increasingly important role as a policy tool for monetary authorities over the past decade. Combining a modified Lucas supply function, the paper induces central bank communication into the model, to study the relationship between inflation and central bank communication. The model shows that the inflation rate will decrease if central bank communication tends to intense. Based on the data during the period of 2003-2009 and a structural VAR model, the empirical results are as follows： （1） Central bank communication can effectively lower down the inflation expectation and nominal inflation rate with short time lag. （2） Actual intervention may raise the inflation expectation and the nominal inflation rate in short term. In addition, we analyze the fact that the central bank communication is ambiguous in most cases.