CEO权力、独立董事和资本支出决策

CEO Power,Independent Director and Capital Expenditure Decisions

公司治理机制的效率不仅体现在公司价值的提升上,更应该体现在各类代理成本比如不必要资本支出的削减上。选取2007～2009年97家房地产上市公司为样本,以企业资本支出水平为切入点,分析独立董事和CEO权力对资本支出决策的影响。研究发现:(1)高管层权力越大,越倾向于加大资本支出,任职时间长和两职合一的高管层更是如此;(2)财务专家型独立董事比例的提高能够有效抑制高管层滥用权力增加的资本支出;(3)通过对不同股权性质企业分析,国有企业中财务专家型独立董事对抑制资本支出水平的有效性显著强于非国有企业。

The validity of corporate governance should be reflected not only in improving corporate value,more importantly,should be reflected in decreasing all kinds of agency costs.The paper empirically tests the relations between CEO power,independent director and capital expenditure decisions using the data of real-estates＇ listed companies from 2007 to 2009.The research results show：（1）CEO power is more strength,CEO will be inclined to increase capital expenditure,especially when CEO is board chairman;（2） The higher of the ratio of the independent director owning financing background,the less of capital expenditure;（3） The effect of restricting capital expenditure by independent director owning financing background is stronger in state-owned corporate than in non-state owned corporate.