建筑施工企业承建工程项目“游说行为”双向效应研究——基于信息租金理论(information rent theory)的分析

A study of the dual effects of building construction companies’ lobbying activities from the perspective of the information rent theory

施工企业在建设工程项目经营中,通常利用其信息优势进行游说来影响工程项目招标、工程变更和竣工决算的最终结果。本文首先分析了施工企业游说活动的一般机理,然后利用信息租金理论(information rent theory)来论证游说行为存在着正负双向效应,并提出应该积极设置游说水平和游说行为激励机制来积极促进正向效应,而通过施工企业的双重身份制衡等措施来有效抑制负向效应。

Taking advantage of their information superiority in construction project management, the construction enterprises can influence the final result of projects tendering, project change and budget for the completion of projects. This paper first analyzes the dual effects of lobbying activities. Then applying the information rent theory, it suggests that lobbying lever and incentive mechanism be set to enhance the positive effect and the dual roles of construction enterprise reach an balance to reduce the negatives effect.