监督抑或跟随:机构投资者治理角色研究——来自舞弊公司机构持股行为的经验证据

Monitor or the Follower:The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance

文章利用被中国证券监管部门处罚的舞弊公司及未舞弊公司为对象,考察机构投资者在公司治理中是扮演监督者还是跟随者角色。研究发现,从公司舞弊前一季度到后一季度机构投资者并未减持舞弊公司股份,不具备舞弊预测与识别能力;机构投资者倾向于利用分析师评级结果进行投资决策;机构投资者容易被舞弊公司误导,而分析师评级则有助于减轻机构投资者被误导程度。结果表明,目前机构投资者更多扮演着跟随分析师的消极角色而非有效监督者的积极角色,分析师评级具有一定的决策有用性。

Using the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies that were punished by CSRC and its＂ matched companies , we examine what role institutional investors play based on analying institutional investors＇ shareholding behavor. It is found that institutional investors don＇t decrease their ownship of fraud campanies during the period that one quarter before and one quarter after companies＂ financial fraudluent behavior, which means institutional investors have no capability of fraud behavior forecast and identification. Institutional investors tended to invest based on analystg recommendations. What＇s more, institutional investors appeared to be fooled by financial statement fraud, but analystg recommendations can help to lessen the degree that institutional in- vestors be fooled. The results above means the role of institutional investors is not a monitor but a follower of securities analysts, and analysts＂ recommendations have some usability for investment