不平衡报价的量化识别与博弈研究

Quantitative indentification and study of gaming on imbalance bid

工程量清单计价下,招投标阶段清单工程量的准确性和完整性风险由业主负责.承包商既要增加利润,又要尽可能中标,投标时往往采用不平衡报价法,但这将损害业主利益.文中借用线性规划和资金的时间价值理论,通过建立不平衡报价利润最大化数学模型,定量分析了投标人不平衡报价的实质和模式;投标人常用的不平衡报价模式可归结为"多收钱"、"早收钱"和混合模式;相应识别投标人不平衡报价的方法有报价范围监控法、累计进度款比较法和净现值评价法三种;最后分析了不平衡报价的多方博弈.

In the quantity bill of pricing,during the period of the bid and tender,if the owner who is to take charge of the risk of the quantity bill veracity and integrality.The contractor sometimes adopts the imbalance bid in order to increases his profit as well as to gain the tender.But this will impair the advantage of the owner.The paper establishes the mathematics mode of the max profit in the imbalance bid,and analyses the essential of the imbalance bid mode.The tenders often use the imbalance bid mode for more income,early income or both.The methods of identifying the imbalance bid have the supervising range of quatation,the comparing of the accumulative total schedule price and the net present price and so on.At last,the paper analyzes the game in the course of the imbalance bid.