终极股东特征、公司多元化与融资约束

Ultimate Shareholders,Diversification and Financial Constrains

理论研究表明公司多元化经营形成的内部资本市场有助于缓解公司所面临的融资约束,不同的终极股东特征可能由于代理问题或由于加强内部资本市场功能而减弱或增强缓解公司融资约束的作用。本文以2004～2009年中国上市公司作为样本,实证考察不同终极股东特征下,非国有控制公司与国有控制公司多元化经营战略缓解公司融资约束的作用是否存在显著差异。实证结果表明当终极股东现金流权与控制权不偏离,或者当终极股东控制链层级较多时,非国有控制公司多元化缓解融资约束的作用显著强于国有控制公司。然而,当终极股东现金流权与控制权偏离,或者当终极股东控制链层级较少时,国有控制公司多元化缓解融资约束的作用并没有显著强于非国有控制公司。

Theoretical research suggests that internal capital markets of diversified firms are important to alleviate financial constraints.When the listed firm is controlled by an ultimate shareholder,the functions of internal capital markets may be weaken or strengthen.Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from the period 2004 to 2009,the empirical results suggest that the effects of corporate diversification on financial constraints of non-state-owned firms are more significant than that of state-owned firms when the cash flow rights are not separated from voting rights or the control structure has more layers.However,the effects of corporate diversification on financial constraints of state-owned firms are not more significant than that of non-state-owned firms when the cash flow rights are separated from voting rights or the control structure has fewer layers.