中国古代食盐专卖的新制度经济学分析——以明朝“开中法”之动因与结构、演化与锁定为例

New Institutional Economic Analysis of Salt Monopoly in Ancient China: Taking Motive,Structure, Evolution and Final Determination of Kaizhong System during the Ming Dynasty as an Example

学界对于中国古代食盐专卖制度研究大多基于历史学范畴而鲜有经济学视角,本文运用新制度经济学的相关理论进行"新经济史"研究,以明朝"开中法"这一特殊历史阶段下的食盐专卖制度为例。依托史实,从国家性质与垄断利润角度解释了食盐专卖制度实行的动因,并进一步探讨其结构性问题:由于分利集团各自集体行动、腐败寻租以及共容利益的缺失导致制度运行效率与相应的社会福利损失。同时通过制度变迁与路径依赖的理论,从动态演化角度阐释了专卖制度"锁定"与衰亡的内在逻辑。最后指出,只有构建保护私有产权的强化市场型政府才是推动经济增长与繁荣的应有之意。

Previous studies on salt monopoly system in ancient China are mostly based on the history category but lack economic perspective.This paper makes a study of new economic history through relevant theories of new institutional economics and takes the salt monopoly system during the Ming dynasty as an example.Firstly,it explains the motive for implementing the salt monopoly system from the angle of state nature and monopoly profits,and discusses its structural issue： respective collective actions of special interest groups,corruption and rent-seeking behavior and a lack of encompassing interests give rise to low institutional operating efficiency and losses of social welfare.Then it explains the internal logic concerning the final determination and decline of monopoly system from the angle of dynamic evolution by theories of institutional changes and path dependence.Finally,it points out that the construction of market-oriented governments aiming at protecting private property rights is the only way to advance economic growth and prosperity.