杜威的演化论式的知识论图景——一种理性的重构和辩护

The Reconstruction and Justification of Dewey's Evolutionary Approach to Epistemology

杜威哲学(尤其是其论文《对野蛮人心灵的解释》)启发了一种对演化论式知识论的重构和辩护。从总体上说,这种知识论理论依然是"可靠主义"的一个变种,因为它依然试图通过认知机制自身的可靠性来为由这些机制所产生的信念提供认识担保。但它至少在两个关键方面和传统可靠主义分道扬镳:第一,通过对于杜威的实用主义哲学的继承,这种新可靠主义不再把"真信念比例"视为界定认知机制可靠性的基本话语框架,而主张在一个更深的层面上用"有用性"来替换"真";第二,通过对于演化论思想的更直接的依赖,这种新可靠主义排除了用其他非科学方式来解释人类认知机制之可靠性的可能,并通过这种排除更加紧密地将知识论研究和科学研究联系到了一起。从这种意义上说,这种被"杜威化"的人类信念辩护方案,才是一种真正彻底的自然主义方案。与之相比较,传统的可靠主义理论却完全有可能和一种非自然主义的(甚至神学的)立场相互结合(如在普兰丁格的知识论那里)。

This article is intended to offer a systematic reconstruction of John Dewey＇s evolutionary approach to epistemology by basing on the reading of his comments on ＂Savage Minds＂. I will argue that his epistemological theory, thus reconstructed, can be somehow viewed as a variant of contemporary ＂epistemologieal reliabilism＂ in the following sense： it is intended to warrant human＇s beliefs in terms of the ＂reliability＂ of the cognitive faculties which have produced these beliefs. But it is still different from the standard reliabilism in two aspects： First, its substantial involvement of pragmatism into the Deweyan epistemological proposal makes the semantic notion ＂truth＂ itself less fundamental than reliabilists have traditionally conceived. Hence, according to this updated proposal, it will be no longer plausible to define the reliability of cognitive faculties in terms of ＂truth ratio of the produced beliefs＂, unless ＂truth＂ is replaced by ＂usefulness/utility＂. Second, due to its more substantial reliance on evolutionary theory, this updated epistemological proposal precludes any attempts to explain the reliability of human＇s cognitive faculties in some none-scientific manner. Hence, the whole proposal turns out to be more ＂naturalistic＂ than the standard reliabilism, according to which a reliabilist epistemological approach may also be accommodated in a theological framework （e. g. , in Plantinga＇s case）.