需求依赖价格且模糊的供应链回购契约

Buy-back Contract of Supply Chain With Price-dependent and Fuzzy Demand

在需求依赖价格且模糊的假设下,研究了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链回购契约协调机制.首先,运用可信性理论,建立了分散决策下的Stackelberg博弈模型,给出了模型最优解的求解过程.其次,研究了一体化决策问题,得到了系统最优解,并通过比较说明分散决策不能实现供应链系统的最优化;再次,建立了基于回购契约的供应链协调模型,分析了回购机制下的最优解与集中决策最优解的关系;最后,给出了供应链能够实现完美协调的充分条件.

Assuming that the demand is price-dependent and fuzzy,the buy-back coordination mechanism of a supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer is studied.Firstly,using the credibility theory,we set up the decentralized Stackelberg game model and give the procedure to find out the optimal solutions.Secondly,we study the integration decision problem and get the system＇s optimal solutions.The comparison of the results explains that the optimal solutions under the decentralized decision can not realize the supply chain system to be optimal.Thirdly,we build the supply chain coordination model based on the buy-back contract and analyse the relationship between the optimal solution of the buy-back mechanism and the one of the centralized decision.Finally,the sufficient condition to achieve the perfect supply chain coordination is getted.