摘要
股票分割是企业常用的一种财务政策 ,它只增加企业股票的数目 ,并不影响原有股东的持股份额及股本的帐面价值 ,但拆股往往又会带来积极的股价反应。本文首先在综述有关文献的基础上 ,认为引入信息不对称的交易区间假设能更合理地解释企业拆股的动因 ;其次 ,本文给出了一个严密的交易区间假设的数学模型 ,管理层通过拆股宣告向投资者传递其关于企业前景的私人信息 ;最后 ,本文结合我国的实际情况 。
This paper examines the reason for firms to split their stocks since it can only increase the stock numbers and cannot affect original stockholders' ownership percentage. There are several explanations to the puzzle of stock split. We think the trading range hypothesis under the background of asymmetric information may be a more reasonable answer. Actually firms signal their private information about future earnings by their choice of split factor. A rather formal model is set up to prove this. In the end we discuss the implications of this theory in our own capital market and give some suggestions to the establishment of an effective signal market.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2000年第4期8-11,共4页
Journal of Finance and Economics