企业契约与会计选择

Contract of Firm and Accounting Policy Choice

本文讨论了在企业契约的影响下会计政策选择的机制安排。由于企业契约具有的交易特别性及可塑性使得会计政策的选择具有某些产权的特性 ,这样 ,由此产生的经济后果吸引企业的所有者不会愿意完全将这一权力让渡给管理当局 ,而往往采用大股东 -管理当局共同控制的方法以防止道德风险和交易胁迫。

In this paper,we argued that the pattern in which management of firm totally occupied the right to choose accounting policy is unjustifiable. Due to the transaction specific and plastic of the firm contract,economic consequences of accounting policy choice makes it become a certain of property right which can affect interests of entities related. Thus,owner,especially those controlled the firm,would share this right with management to protect from moral hazard and hold up.