摘要
风险投资中的信息不对称性严重影响了风险投资的成效,是风险投资研究中的一个重点研究问题。文中针对信息的不对称性,分别对风险投资家和创业企业家进行了分析。首先,文中在海萨尼转换后的博弈模型的基础上,分析了风险投资前的逆向选择问题;其次,文中分析了委托代理理论在研究风险投资家与创业企业家的关系上的不足,并在此基础上研究了所有权与控制权的较量,运用博弈论的思想进行辛迪加联盟的博弈分析,另外还对于创业企业家所受到的道德风险问题进行了探究。
The information asymmetry of venture capital has seriously affected in the effectiveness of venture capital.It is a key research problem in venture capital research.For information asymmetry,venture capitalists and entrepreneurs were analysis separately in this paper.First of all,this paper use Harsanyi transformed game model to analysis the adverse selection problem in pre-investment risk.Secondly,this paper analysis the lack of the principal-agent theory in the study of the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.And on this basis,this paper studies the contest of ownership and control,and uses the game theory ideas to analysis the game of Syndicate Alliance.In addition,this paper carried out to explore the issue of moral hazard problem that entrepreneurs suffered.
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2012年第3期172-175,180,共5页
Logistics Engineering and Management
关键词
风险投资
逆向选择
道德风险
博弈论
venture capital
adverse selection
moral hazard
game theory
