基于完全但不完美信息的双房价三方动态博弈

Dual Price-Three Sides Dynamic Game of Real Estate Market Based on Complete but Imperfect Information

近年来,高房价一度引发全民关注。构建在完全但不完美信息基础上的双房价三方动态博弈模型,运用贝叶斯法则和逆向归纳法分析了三方各自的收益和策略组合,给出了博弈的完美贝叶斯均衡。由于不完美信息的影响,购房者就房地产商发出的高价、低价的信息对市场运行前景之好坏加以判断,决定是否购买。政府在此博弈中占据主导地位,出台的政策将影响市场运行前景和三方的收益及策略选择。

In recent years,the high price of China＇s real estate market attracts high attention.The dual price-three sides dynamic game model based on complete but imperfect information,using Bayesian Rule and Backward Induction to analyze the strategies of each side and find out the equilibrium of this game.Estate purchasers base their decision on their judgment of the market information and prospect.The government plays a critical rule in this game,its attitudes and policies have a direct effect on both buyers and sellers.