买方抗衡势力对上游企业产品策略的影响

Effect of Retailers' Countervailing Power on Product Strategy of Upstream Enterprises

在上游单一制造商,下游寡头竞争的纵向关系结构下,构建上游生产商差异化生产策略和下游双寡头竞争的动态博弈模型,分析了买方抗衡势力存在与否情况下上游厂商不同的策略选择对企业利润和消费者效用水平的影响.结果表明,当不存在买方抗衡势力时,上游厂商可以通过生产互补程度较高的产品提高企业利润;当其中一方零售商存在买方抗衡势力时,产品互补性越强,上游企业利润越大.当存在买方抗衡势力时,考察了不同策略对消费者效用的影响.

Under the vertical structure of a single upstream producer and downstream oligarch competition,a dynamic game model was constructed about the upstream producers＇ differentiated manufacturing strategy and the downstream retailers＇ competition of double oligarchies.The effects of the upstream producers＇ differentiated strategies on their own enterprise profits and consumers＇ utility level were analyzed with or without the retailers＇ countervailing power.The results indicated that when the retailers don＇t have the countervailing power,the upstream producers tend to manufacture complementary products to improve their enterprise profits.When one of the retailers owns the countervailing power,the more complementary a product is,the greater the upstream enterprise＇s profiti is.In addition,the effects of product strategy on the consumer utility was studied when the retailers＇ countervailing power existed.