摘要
传统科学哲学中规则系统式定律观与普遍必然式定律观,分别代表了定律形而上学观点的最弱与最强的两端,而休谟式随附可以被看作处于这两端之间。这三者构成的定律形而上学谱系,都首先需要承诺对象及其属性的本体论优先性。可是,这时这一谱系的内部区间划分其实并不清楚。于是,对这三种观点尤其是休谟式随附与普遍必然式定律观的哲学分析就是必要的,并且有可能在结合对实际的科学定律案例的分析后获得一种超出了已有形而上学观念的定律观。
The regularity or systems view on laws of science represents the "weakness" metaphysical conception,and the universals or necessitarianism view is the "strongest" in classical philosophy of science.Then Humean superveniece can be regarded as "between" them.A metaphysical spectrum of laws of science constructed by the above-mentioned three ideas should accept the ontological priority of objects and their properties firstly.However,domains inside this spectrum can't be distinguished distinctly as assumption with the above widespread acceptance.Therefore,philosophical analysis on the above-mentioned three ideas,especially the Humean supervience and the universals or necessitarianism view is necessary,from which it is possible to gain a new conception of laws beyond the three existing views by analysis combined cases of actual laws of science.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第4期18-23,共6页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目"语言知识论研究"(11CZX024)
关键词
定律
休谟式随附
形而上学
对象
Laws of Nature
Humean Supervience
Metaphysics
Object