试析终极控制人两权分离度对盈余管理的影响——来自沪深股市的经验证据

Discussion on the Effect of Separation Degree of Ultimate Controller on Earning Management——Based on the Empirical Evidence of Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange

本文以2010年沪深上市公司为样本,采用基本Jones模型和线下项目法分别计算线上项目操纵性应计利润和线下项目操纵性应计利润,考察了终极控制人两权分离度以及终极控制人性质与盈余管理的关系,得出以下结论:(1)线上项目盈余管理程度与两权分离度显著正相关,终极控制人更倾向于通过隐蔽性更强的线上项目进行盈余管理;(2)当终极控制人性质为非国有时,终极控制人更有动机通过线上项目进行盈余管理。

In this paper,with the samples of listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange in 2010,by using discretionary accruals estimated by Jones model（1991）and the items below lines,we examine the relationship between earning management and separation degree of ultimate controller,and the nature of it.It turns out that,first,the level of separation has a significantly positive relationship with the degree of earnings management by items up the lines with much more concealment.Second,non state-owned controllers have more motives to manage the earnings by items up the lines.