动态寡头市场博弈条件下企业创新能力的产品创新及工艺创新选择

The Effect of Firms ’ Innovation Ability on the Choice between Product Innovation and Process Innovation Based on the Dynamics Duopoly Game Theory

应用双寡头动态博弈的均衡方法,研究企业创新能力对企业进行产品创新和工艺创新的影响;引入产品创新成本系数的概念,建立企业的创新能力、竞争激烈程度以及企业的产品质量和技术创新种类的关系,推导出企业创新模式的判据式。结果显示,企业产品创新能力越强,在Bertrand竞争和Cournot竞争中都选择产品创新的可能性越大。当企业产品创新能力下降到一定的程度,高质量企业在Cournot竞争中首选工艺创新;低质量企业在Bertrand竞争中首选工艺创新。

With the method of dynamics duopoly game theory,the effect of firms＇ innovation ability on the choice between product and process innovation is studied.The concept of cost coefficient of product innovation is introduced,and the criterion equation for the innovation type is derived.It is concluded that the more the product innovation ability,the more the possibility for the firms to carry out the product innovation in both the Bertrand and the Cournot competitions.With the decrease of the product innovation ability,for the high-quality firms,Cournot competitor tends to select the process innovation earlier than the Bertrand competitor.But for the low-quality firms,the Bertrand competitor would select the process innovation firstly.