管理层股权激励:利益趋同还是利益壕沟——来自股权分置改革后中国上市公司的经验证据

Managerial Stock Incentives: Convergence of Interests Effect or Entrenchment Effect

本文从股权分置改革的制度背景来考察国内上市公司管理层股权激励效应及其内在机理。研究结果表明,股权分置改革后,管理层股权激励显著提高了公司绩效,但在不同产权性质公司中激励效果不同:非国有控股公司表现为利益趋同效应,股权激励降低了代理成本,改善了公司绩效;而国有控股公司表现为利益壕沟效应,股权激励对代理成本和公司绩效没有显著影响。进一步研究发现,国有控股公司内部人控制、管理层权力过大是股权激励效应弱化的主要原因。

In the background of ownership-split reform,the paper studies the effect of managerial stock incentives and its mechanism.The results show that managerial stock incentives significantly improve firm performance,and have different effects in various types of firms: in non-state-owned firms,managerial stock incentives lead to convergence of interests effect,reduce agency cost and improve firm performance;in state-owned firms,managerial stock incentives lead to entrenchment effect,and have no obvious effects on agency cost and firm performance.Further researches indicate that in state-owned firms,insider control and excessive managerial power are main reasons for the lack of stock incentives effects.