提高地方政府投资效率的思考——基于双重委托代理模型的分析

Thought on Improve The Efficiency of Local Government Investment——Based on the Analysis of Double Principal-agent Model

利用双重委托代理模型,从理论上论证合理的激励约束机制设计会提高地方政府投资效率,并对GDP、财政收入及地方政府投资进行Granger因果关系检验和脉冲响应函数分析,得出以GDP和财政收入作为激励约束机制确实会使地方政府产生短期投资行为,降低投资效率。提出了完善激励约束机制和加强社会监督力度的对策建议。

This paper uses the double principal -agent model, in theory, to prove that the reasonable incentive and restraint mechanisms design will improve the efficiency of local government investment, and makes the GDP, fiscal revenue and local government investment Granger causality test and impulse response function analysis, con- cluded that to GDP and fiscal revenue as an incentive and restraint mechanism will make a short -term local gov- ernment investment behavior and reduce the efficiency of investment. This paper will put forward suggestions of im- proving the incentive and restraint mechanisms and strengthening social supervision against the demonstration and analysis.