资金约束下的逆向拍卖

Reverse Auction under Budget Constraints

当多个供应商竞争产品的供应权时,逆向拍卖是采购商用于确定产品采购价格和选择供应商的重要机制。假设零售商利用一价逆向拍卖选择供应商,在零售商因资金不足而向金融机构贷款或延期支付供应商的货款两种情形下,研究供应商不同的均衡竞标策略,零售商不同的最优保留价格和相应的期望成本。比较两种情形下,零售商期望成本的大小,给出零售商选择贷款还是延期付款的条件。最后,用数值算例分析了多个参数对零售商的期望成本的影响。

Reverse auction is an important mechanism that helps the buyer to determine the procurement price and identify the best supplier when there are multiple potential suppliers competing for supply chance.Assuming that the retailer selects the best supplier by use of the first-price reverse auction and the retailer may loan from the bank or delay the payment to the supplier when he/she faces the budget constraint,we study the suppliers＇ equilibrium bidding strategies,the retailer＇s optimal reserving price and expected cost within the two contexts.A comparison of the retailer＇s expected cost is performed.The numerical example and sensitive analysis are presented.