期刊文献+

投标者为风险规避型引入佣金的分析(一) 被引量:1

Analysis of Commission on Auctions under Bidders-risk-averse
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摘要 在投标者为风险规避型的情况下,考虑引入佣金对拍卖结果的影响,发现在对称独立私有价值模型中,对于密封一价拍卖和密封二价拍卖,佣金比例k越大,则投标者的报价越低,卖方的期望收益越少,拍卖行的期望收益越大,但投标者的期望效用与k无关。 The effects of commission on auctions were discussed when bidders were risk-averse.It was found that the commission rate has effects on the bidders′ bidding strategy,the expected revenue of the seller and the auctioneer.The bigger the commission rate is,the lower the bidder bids,and the less expected revenue the seller makes,but the more revenue the auctioneer has.And the bidder′s expected utility is not dependent on the commission rate.
作者 肖海燕
出处 《武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)》 CAS 2012年第2期250-252,共3页 Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Information & Management Engineering
基金 湖北省教育厅科学技术研究计划指导性基金资助项目
关键词 拍卖 风险规避 佣金 均衡期望效用 auction risk-averse commission equilibrium expected utility
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参考文献15

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二级参考文献41

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共引文献63

同被引文献11

  • 1王彦,毕志伟,李楚霖.佣金收取对拍卖结果的影响[J].管理科学学报,2004,7(4):45-48. 被引量:28
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  • 3DASGUIYFA P,MASKIN E. Efficient auctions[J]. Quar- terly Journal of Economics,2000(ll5) : 341 - 388.
  • 4MASKIN E,RILEY J. Asymmetric auctions[J]. Review of Economic Studies,2000 ( 67 ) :413 - 438.
  • 5MCAFEE P, MCMILLAN J. Bidding tings [ J ]. Ameri- can Economic Review, 1992 (82) :579 - 599.
  • 6ARMSTRONG M. Optimal multi - object auctions [ J ]. Review of Economic Studies,2000 (67) : 455 - 481.
  • 7MANELLI A M, SEFTON M, WILNER B S. Multi - unit auctions: a comparison of static and dynamic mechanisms [ J ]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Or- ganization ,2006 (61) : 304 - 323.
  • 8BIEHLER M. An experimental analysis of multi - at- tribute auction [ ] ]. Decision Support Systems, 2000 (29) :249 - 268.
  • 9SALMON T C, WILSON B J. Second chance offers ver- sus sequential auctions: theory and behavior[ J]. Eco- nomic Theory ,2008 (34) :47 - 67.
  • 10ARMSTRONG M. Optimal multi - object auctions [ J ]. Review of Economic Studies,2000(67) : 455 -451.

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