摘要
本文运用激励机制设计理论，分析了Ｒ＆ Ｄ 中的代理问题，优化设计了Ｒ＆ Ｄ机构和Ｒ＆ Ｄ 人员间的利益分享规则，对Ｒ＆ Ｄ 项目中每个Ｒ＆ Ｄ人员的报酬机制进行Ｐａｒｅｔｏ 改进。
In this paper, we use the theory of incentive mechanism to analysize the agency problem during R&D, then we optimally design the profit sharing rules between R&D unit and R&D people, finally we improve the reward system for R&D people in a R&D project team from the pareto point of view.
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2000年第1期81-86,共6页
Science Research Management
关键词
R&D
代理人
委托人
报酬机制
激励机制
R&D
principal-agency relationship
Incentive-compatible
Moral-hazard
paretosuboptimum.
