摘要
股东控制是美国公司法的基础,而"一股一权"则是该基础的核心。纽约证券交易所在20世纪初迫于政治压力,在上市公司标准中确立了一股一权原则。但在1980年代,纽约证券交易所因美国证券交易所和纳斯达克交易所的竞争压力,放弃了这一上市标准,引起了美国学者对该原则的广泛争议。一股一权原则的合理性尽管经过了学者的多次论证,但大部分国家公司法并没有将这一原则贯彻到底。实证研究表明,股权结构与公司业绩并不存在确定的关系。允许公司按实际情况设计股权结构,可能更有利于公司长远发展,但其前提是健全公司治理制度和投资者保护制度。
In the USA, shareholder control is the foundation of corporate law whereas one share one vote is the core of the foundation. Under political pressure, the NYEX accepted the principle of "one share, one vote" as test of listing corporations at the beginning of the 20th century. Confronted with sharp competition of the AMEX and the NASDQ in the 1980s, the NYEX had to stop employing the test, which arose much contro- versy among scholars. As a test, one share one vote has been justified academically for many times, but it is not carried through by most countries' corporate laws. Positive researches show that now determinable relation- ship existing between share structure and corporate achievements. Permitting corporations to set up their own share structures may conduce to their development in the long run which is, however, premised on improvement of corporate governance and protection of investors.
出处
《现代法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第2期152-163,共12页
Modern Law Science
关键词
一股一权
分类股份
股权结构
one share, one vote
dual class stock
share structure