国际调停发生的讨价还价模型：一种定量检验

The Bargaining Model of International Mediation Onset:A Quantitative Test

国际冲突是否经历调停是由调停的供给方(即调停者)和需求方(即争端方)共同决定的。与既有大多数研究强调影响调停发生的"深层原因"不同,作者借鉴理性主义解释视角,着重关注影响调停发生的"即时原因",即将调停的发生视为需求方讨价还价成功的结果。根据理性主义的解释,影响需求方讨价还价结果的主要障碍有私有信息(包括故意误传私有信息)、承诺问题和议题不可分割性三种,而第三方调停者的干预可以帮助需求方克服这三种障碍,从而增加调停发生的可能性。作者使用"国际危机行为"和"国际冲突管理"两个数据库数据,运用统计方法检验了调停发生的讨价还价模型。统计结果表明,当影响需求方之间讨价还价结果的三种问题得到有效管理时,国际冲突更容易经历调停。

Whether an international conflict sees mediation is determined both by the supply-side(the mediator) and the demand-side(the disputants) of mediation.In contrast to most existing research on the impact of underlying causes on the onset of mediation,this article emphasizes the effect of immediate causes on mediation onset from a rationalist explanation perspective,which views the occurrence of mediation as the result of a successful bargaining between disputants.In the light of the rationalist explanation,the outcome of bargaining process between disputants is mainly determined by three factors:private information(including incentives to mispresent such information),commitment problem,and issue indivisibilities.The intervention of third-party mediator can help disputants overcome these barriers,and thus increase the likelihood of mediation onset.This bargaining model of mediation onset is examined empirically with the data taken from the international crisis behavior project and the international conflict management project.The statistical results suggest that an international conflict is more likely to see mediation when these three bargaining barriers are managed effectively.