委托代理框架下的薪酬及对经理人的激励

The Payment and its Encouragement for Manager under Principle-Agent Framework

在委托代理问题当中,如何支付代理人的薪酬一直是研究的热点。本文考虑了信息对称(代理人行为可观测)和信息不对称(代理人行为不可观测)两种情况下经理人的最优努力程度及委托人支付给经理人的最优薪酬。文章还以若干封闭式基金的累计单位净值及管理人报酬等数据,分析了我国封闭式基金的业绩对薪酬的影响。

The problem of salary payment to agents has been a hot topic in principal - agent research. In this paper, we consider the optimal degree of effort that the manager would exert and the optimal salary that the principal shall pay under the information symmetry （agent＇ s behavior is observable ） and information asymmetry （ agent＇ s behavior is unobservable） respectively. We also use the data of the unit net value and the salary payment of closed - end funds in China to analyze the influence of salary on performance.