“债转股”与高管薪酬业绩敏感性研究

On Debt-to-Equity Swap and Performance Sensibility of Senior Executive Compensation

"债转股"对高管激励具有显著影响,基于A股上市公司样本研究发现,相对于非"债转股"公司来说,"债转股"公司的高管薪酬业绩敏感性较高,"债转股"能提高对公司高管的激励效应。提高高管薪酬业绩敏感性要结合公司治理结构的优化,当单一大股东持股比例过高时,可以引进新的股东改善公司治理的监督机制以更好地激励高管;企业所有权分配的支配权的让渡必须依靠各产权主体之间的资源谈判来完成,应使债权人在公司治理中更好地发挥相机治理及其对高管激励的替代效应。

Debt-to-equity swap has a significant influence on senior executive incentive.Based on A-share listed companies,the paper shows that the performance sensibility of senior executive compensation of debt-to-equity swap companies is higher than that of non debt-to-equity swap companies.The results show that debt-to-equity is beneficial to the incentive effect of senior executives.Improv-ment of performance sensibility of senior executive compensation needs to be combined with the optimization of corporate governance structure.So when the share proportion of the single largest shareholder is too high,new shareholders can be introduced to improve supervision mechanism of corporate governance to incent the senior executives better.The demisability of eminent domain of enterprise ownership can be achieved must rely on the resources between property right subjects.It is reasonable to let creditors give full play in contingent governance and substitution effect of senior executive incentive.