媒体关注的治理效应及其治理机制研究

Study on Governance Effect and Mechanism of Media Attention

作为法律外的制度,媒体关注是否具有治理效应?其作用机制是什么?这些问题已成为当前财务学研究的热点问题。本文选择2004-2008年中国A股上市企业为研究样本,聚焦上市公司会计信息的披露问题,系统性分析了媒体关注、盈余操纵及应计误定价之间的关系。研究发现:(1)在控制内生性问题后,媒体关注和管理层盈余操纵存在显著负向关系,表明媒体关注度的提高有助于抑制管理层主观的盈余操纵行为;(2)通过"Mishkin检验"发现我国A股市场整体上存在应计误定价现象,并且这种应计误定价主要是由于操纵性应计误定价引起的,表明管理层的盈余操纵行为是应计误定价的重要成因;(3)通过多种方法联合检验发现媒体关注与应计误定价之间存在显著负向关系,表明媒体关注度的提高能够有效提高市场对会计盈余构成信息的定价效率,减少应计误定价情况的出现。总体来看,媒体关注具有深度治理效应,其作用机制是:媒体关注有效抑制了管理层盈余操纵行为,从而提高了会计信息质量并最终提升了市场对盈余构成信息的定价效率,减少了应计误定价情况的出现。

Can media attention reflect the corporate governance role, as a system outside the law If it can, then what is governance mechanism？ Using the date of China listed-stock companies from 2004 to 2008, the authors investigate the relationship of media attention, earnings manipulation and the mispricing of accruals by focusing on the disclosure of accounting information. Results show that： 1） firms that receive more media attention exhibit lower degree of earnings manipulation under controlling endogenous problems, indicating that media attention has a corporate governance effect in Chinese stock market; 2） using the Mishkin and hedge- portfolio test methods Sloan employs, the authors find that stock price in Chinese stock market couldn＇t rationally reflect the one-year-ahead earnings implications of total accruals and abnormal accruals estimated from ROA-adjusted modified Jones model. In conclusion, media attention has a corporate governance effect in Chinese stock market. Media attention could restrain the earnings-manipulating behavior of the management, improve the accounting information quality, promote pricing efficiency of stock market for different earnings composition and lower the mispricing degree of accruals.