摘要
财政分权是中印两国重要的经济制度安排。地方政府债务问题是与分权制度分不开的。本文通过分析中印两国的财政分权运行机制,考察软预算约束环境下,中央政府和地方政府之间财权与事权的分配关系、地方政府之间的竞争关系以及地方政府与其辖区内居民的监督关系,进而探讨两国地方政府债务形成机制。两国地方债务的产生源于分权过程中中央政府与地方政府财权和事权的不相匹配,以及地方政府在软预算约束下的经济行为。
Fiscal decentralization is an important economic arrangement in China and India. In the course of economic growth, local government's debt has attracted more and more attention, which is closely related to fiscal decentralization. By comparison between the operation mechanisms of fiscal decentralization between the two countries, this paper analyzes in the soft budget constraint the allocation relationship of financial power and routine power between central and local government, the competitive relationship between local government and supervision relationship between local government and residents, in order to discuss generation mechanism of local government debt of the two countries. The conclusion is that the debt of the two countries was generated in the process of fiscal decentralization, mismatch of financial power and routine power between central and local government, and economic behavior of local government in soft budget constraint.
出处
《亚太经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第3期30-36,共7页
Asia-Pacific Economic Review
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地辽宁大学转型国家经济政治研究中心重大项目"转型政治经济学导论"(10JJDGJW009)
辽宁大学"211"工程三期标志性成果项目"转型经济学导论"的阶段性研究成果
关键词
财政分权
软预算约束
地方政府债务
fiscal decentralization, soft budget constraint, local government debt