国有企业管理者行为与目标激励

Action-target Stimuli to the Managers of China's State-owned Enterprises

我国国有企业管理者存在双重性的目标激励,即企业薪酬目标和政府职务目标。这样双重目标的产生是源于我国国有企业的产权制度和治理结构的安排,同时也是受制于企业的双重目标,即微观经营效益目标和政府宏观经济目标。然而,双重性目标激励的存在是国有企业效益低下,治理行为不规范的重要原因。因此,国有企业改革过程中需要对这一目标激励进行调整和转变。

The managers of China＇s state-owned enterprises have two target stimuli, that is, the pay- ment target of enterprises and the target of the government＇s functions. The two target are related to the ownership of China＇s state-owned enterprises and the administrative structures and are under the control of the enterprise＇s micro-management goal and the government＇s macro-economic goal. They are the major cause of the poor efficiency and management of China＇s state-owned enterprises, which needs proper reform.