摘要
文章通过建立委托代理模型,对农村小额信贷市场中担保贷款以及随机配对连带责任贷款的贷款合同设定进行了分析。现有研究缺乏对于担保贷款的分析,对连带责任贷款的分析也大多建立在正向配对的假设上。通过对担保贷款与连带责任贷款进行的模型化分析,得出了相应的次优合同集以及借贷双方的剩余。研究结论表明,担保贷款合同可以达到最优合同安排的状态,而随机配对的连带责任贷款仅能达到次优的资源配置效果。在推行连带责任贷款的同时,探索有效的担保形式,发展担保贷款,是小额信贷业务发展的有效途径。
Based on principle-agent models,this paper analyzes the contract design of both secured loan and stochastic matched joint liability loan in rural micro-credit market.Secured loan is analyzed scarcely in recent literature,and research on joint liability loan is mostly proposed a positive matching effect.Through analysis on secured loan and joint liability loan,corre sponding second-best contract sets and surplus conditions are studied.The results show that secured loan contract reach the first-best condition,while stochastic matched joint liability loan just has second-best resource allocation effect.It is rather ef fective for micro-credit development to investigate effective guarantee and develop secured loan when implementing joint liabili ty loan.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
2012年第7期145-149,共5页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家社科基金西部项目(11XJY029)
陕西省软科学项目(2010KRM38)
西安石油大学科技基金研究项目(z09002)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项(QN2009098)
