摘要
公司创业投资的财务收益和战略收益取决于投资企业和公司创投家的投入。本文运用博弈模型分析了公司创业投资的薪酬激励问题,结果表明:薪酬激励对公司创投家的努力程度具有正面影响,而对投资企业的支持力度具有负面影响。投资企业和公司创投家的能力与薪酬激励强度分别呈反向和正向关系,与对方的努力(支持)呈反向关系。项目战略利益与薪酬激励的关系则取决于投资企业和公司创投家能力的相对强弱。在此基础上,本文尝试为研究和实践提出相关建议。
The financial and strategic benefit of corporate venture capital is determined by the involvement of investor firms and corporate venture capitalists.This paper analyzes the incentive compensation of CVC with a game model.The results provide some implications: compensation has a positive influence on corporate venture capitalists' effort,but a negative effect on investor firms'support.Program support capacity of investor firms and corporate venture capitalists has negative and positive relationships with incentive compensation respectively,but has negative relationships with the other party's effort/support.The relationship between strategic benefit and compensation is determined by the relative strengths of investor firm and corporate venture capitalist.Based on these results,the paper provides some suggestions on research and practice.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第2期192-201,共10页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70902080)
关键词
管理科学
公司创业投资
博弈理论
薪酬
激励
management science
corporate venture capital
game theory
compensation
motivating